Electronic Auctions: Role of Visibility Settings in Transparency Analysis
Abstract
Purpose: Main objective of the paper is to assess whether the auctions issuers have changed their preferences regarding the auction transparency described through the visibility settings, and to asses which and to what extent had the other auction parameters impact on the auction transparency and also to assess the effect of the transparency onto the achieved auction savings.
Methodology/Approach: The paper analyses sample records of 5,000 electronic auctions of SR and CR auction issuers on the time frame of 2009-2016, using methods of higher statistics. An composite index for transparency analysis has been developed and assessed. Two standalone regression models were applied to analyse the papers hypotheses regarding the transparency and auctions’ savings.
Findings: The size of the auction described does not have a significant effect on the transparency settings, but the auction complexity does. The most saving generating visibility settings is the visible order of the participants and the visibility of the other measurements settings for the auctions. Increasing the auction complexity can decrease the generated saving by an average 9.3%.
Research Limitation/implication: Research was based on real secondary data from one electronic auction provider. The results are limited to the features enabled on this electronic platform. Results show that the application of visibility setting in auctions can generate additional benefits like savings, but also has to be applied carefully when assessing the transparency.
Originality/Value of paper: The analysis and results based on real secondary data are scare in the current research area, therefore is this article a valued contribution.
References
Beall, S. ed., 2003. The role of reverse auctions in strategic sourcing. Tempe, AZ: W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University; CAPS Research.
Caniëls, M.C.J. and van Raaij, E.M., 2009. Do all suppliers dislike electronic reverse auctions?. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 15(1), pp.12-23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2008.10.003.
Emiliani, M.L., 2005. Regulating B2B online reverse auctions through voluntary codes of conduct. Industrial Marketing Management, [e-journal] 34(5), pp.526-534. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2004.12.003.
Giampietro, C. and Emiliani, M.L., 2007. Coercion and reverse auctions. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, [e-journal] 12(2), pp.75-84. https://doi.org/10.1108/13598540710737253.
Hartley, J.L., Lane, M.D. and Hong, Y., 2004. An exploration of the adoption of E-auctions in supply management. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, [e-joournal] 51(2), pp.153-161. https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2004.826010.
Smart, A. and Harrison, A., 2003. Online reverse auctions and their role in buyer-supplier relationships. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, [e-journal] 9(5), pp.257-268. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2003.09.005
Tassabehji, R., Taylor, W.A., Beach, R. and Wood, A., 2006. Reverse e-auctions and supplier-buyer relationships: An exploratory study. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, [e-journal] 26(2), pp.166-184. https://doi.org/10.1108/01443570610641657.